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Abstract—In this paper, we combine a framework for ethical
requirement elicitation eFRIEND with automated reasoning.
To provide trustworthy and secure IoT for vulnerable users
in healthcare scenarios, we need to apply ethics to arrive at
suitable system requirements. In order to map those to technical
system requirements, we employ high level logical modeling
using dedicated Isabelle frameworks for (1) infrastructures with
human actors and security policies, (2) attack tree analysis, and
(3) security protocol analysis. Following this outline, we apply
these frameworks to a case study for supporting Security and
Privacy when diagnosing Alzheimer’s patients with smartphone
and sensor technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) denotes the combination of
physical objects with their virtual representation in the Inter-
net. It consists not only of human participants but “Things” as
well. The IoT has a great potential to provide novel services
to humans in all parts of our society. Amongst the biggest
problems for this technology to catch on in critical applications
are security flaws, due to technical restrictions, immaturity of
software applications, and mainly a lack of transparency. The
main trigger for security problems is human behaviour, either
unintentional or malicious. In this paper, we give an overview
of how we apply formal techniques to enhance security and
privacy of human centric IoT systems. We focus on healthcare
aiming to support low-cost Alzheimer’s diagnosis. We out-
line the process used in the CHIST-ERA project SUCCESS.
In detail, we report on using a combination of the ethical
framework eFRIEND with interactive theorem proving with
Isabelle. The eFRIEND framework provides a set of rules to
derive requirements based on ethical considerations which can
be transformed into technical system requirements. We use
the proof assistant for the modeling and attack analysis of
infrastructures with humans and for the formal definition cryp-
tographic. We apply the Isabelle Insider framework for human
centric infrastructure analysis and the inductive approach for
security protocol verification to support the secure IoT system
development in the early security requirement phase as well
as the technical network security level.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides a short summary of the techniques
used in the process of formal development that is used in
SUCCESS before highlighting the contributions of the current
paper.
A. Overview of SUCCESS project
The core idea of our approach is to use formal methods and
verification tools to provide more transparency of security risks
for people in given IoT scenarios. SUCCESS will validate the
scientific and technological innovation through pilots, one of
which will be in collaboration with a hospital and will allow
all stakeholders (e.g. physicians, hospital technicians, patients
and relatives) to enjoy a safer system capable to appropriately
handle highly sensitive information on vulnerable people while
making security and privacy risks understandable and secure
solutions accessible.
This international collaboration is funded by the Euro-
pean programme CHIST-ERA [1]. It applies techniques from
hardware and software, user behaviour and human-computer
interaction to a research pilot from the healthcare sector on
supporting IoT monitoring techniques that are human under-
standable and can be certified by automated techniques.
• specification and verification techniques for secure IoT
components and their composition [2],
• verification methods and risk assessment techniques [3]
for IoT scenarios with models of human behavior [4],
social interactions and human-system interactions,
• implementation and modeling languages with algorithms
for the certification of safety, availability, secrecy, and
trustworthiness across from the model to the platform
[5].
B. Contribution of this Paper and Overview
This paper summarizes how the requirements for the IoT
healthcare system can be derived using the eFRIEND frame-
work leading to a high level formal specification in the Isabelle
insider framework [4] which also allows attack tree analysis
[6].
This first phase of the process, the eFRIEND framework,
is introduced in Section III. Its use in the context of the
SUCCESS project is illustrated in Section IV. We map a few
of the requirements onto a simplified architecture and use cases
for the pilot case study. As a result of this first phase, the input
to the BIP-based analysis and component architecture design
and certified code generation is provided. We omit details on
this phase since it is not within the scope of the paper. The
output of this process however is a Java Script smartphone
app capable of synchronous communication within the phone
and via Bluetooth with sensors in the environment of the
phone in the patient’s home. The communication of the smart-
phone app with data servers in hospitals and other institutions
(like research centers) is asynchronous and channeled via the
Internet. It cannot be part of the certified code generation
in BIP (which is restricted to synchronous communication).
Therefore, we show up in Section V what is the state of the
art of technically realizing secure communication for privacy
sensitive data using web services and data interchange formats
using our own protocol that we have developed for this end-
to-end secure connection [7],
III. EFRIEND FRAMEWORK
One important aim of our research is to reinforce the link
between the improved technology and problem solving capa-
bilities and the human beneficiaries. The research we report
in this article is consistent with other user-centric activities
developed by the authors (see for example [8], [9]). Part
of these user-centred activities involve the use of processes
to develop systems which are better aligned with people’s
expectations. One such initiatives, is the use of the eFRIENDS
ethical framework [10]. By ethical framework here we mean
a set of principles which have to be considered when creating
a system, in our case we developed it thinking specifically of
Intelligent Environments (IEs) [11].
The shorter explanation of eFRIEND is that the following
nine principles have to be observed in the construction of an
IE:
1) Beneficence / Non-maleficence
2) Accessibility, Dignity, and Inclusiveness
3) User-centricity
4) Privacy
5) Data Protection
6) Safety, Security, and Reliability
7) Transparency
8) Autonomy
9) Multiple users (stakeholders) consideration
However eFRIEND aims to go beyond the usual (and of
course, useful) philosophical debate about ethics in ICT. Our
ethical framework is an engineering tool. Applying it really
means teams have to embed its principles into the construction
of the system itself, that is, stakeholders have to identify
ways within the system to represent those nine principles
above, developers have to translate them onto requirements
and materialize them in the real system and stakeholders have
to agree at the end these have been achieved in the behaviour
of the system.
For example in our SUCCESS project possible ways to
address these principles are as follows:
Beneficence: enhancing the well-being and quality of life
of SUCCESSs primary users and intended beneficiaries
Non-maleficence: avoid causing harm to SUCCESS users
and intended beneficiaries.
Accessibility: Where smartphones provide the point of
access to SUCCESS, interface design heuristics, navigability
and usability should be considered
Dignity: IoT networks should not replace or substitute for
human care
Inclusiveness: Ensure equal access to potential benefits,
regardless of socio-economic/cultural factors
User-centricity: A broad range of other stakeholders should
be consulted, including health and social care professionals,
and representatives of relevant professional and voluntary
associations.
Privacy: SUCCESS should specify the terms of access to,
and use of, diagnostic and therapeutic medical data, by 3rd
party commercial entities such as insurance and pharmaceuti-
cal companies.
Data Protection: Informed consent procedures to include
certification of authorised proxies or delegated users where
primary users have diminished consent competence.
Security: Robust security and integrity of data transmission
and transfer when live, between home and hospital systems,
between patient records and other datastores, and between
devices and IoT components.
Safety: using the system outside safe environments can
endanger the user by attracting undesirable attention towards
the mobile phone or its data.
Reliability: data loss or unavailability at optimal times will
discourage adoption
Transparency: The functionality of SUCCESS, and its po-
tential weaknesses and effects, should be explained to its
primary users in understandable terms.
Autonomy: Provide users with control over the IoT sensor
environment (systems where users feels trapped, coerced or
unable to opt-out have lower adherence ratios).
Multiple users (stakeholders) consideration: SUCCESS will
be accessed by several users and stakeholders with different,
and sometimes conflicting, expectations.
The application of the eFRIEND framework is shown for
some points in Table 1. For the analysis of the techical
requirements, we use formal methods as is illustrated in the
remainder of the paper.
IV. HEALTHCARE CASE STUDY IN ISABELLE INSIDER
FRAMEWORK
The case study we use as a running example in this paper
is a simplified scenario from the context of the SUCCESS
project for Security and Privacy of the IoT [1]. A central topic
of this project for the pilot case study is to support security and
privacy when using cost effective methods based on the IoT for
monitoring patients for the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease.
As a starting point for the design, analysis, and construction,
we currently develop a case study of a small device for the
analysis of blood samples that can be directly connected to
a mobile phone. The analysis of this device can then be
SUCCESS Ethical Requirements 
 
eFRIEND 
principle 
Contextualization to SUCCESS Requirement(s) candidates Map to System Architecture  
 
Beneficence / 
Non-
maleficence 
Beneficence: enhancing the well-being and quality of life 
of SUCCESS’s primary users and intended beneficiaries 
 
Beneficiaries should feel 
safer using the system 
-Transparency by Attack Tree visualisation of 
security risks to stakeholders 
-Explanation of certified security properties 
 (text or other output from verification process) 
… … … 
Accessibility,  
Dignity, and 
Inclusiveness 
 
… … … 
Dignity: 
! Respecting the dignity of all participants and volunteers 
in the research process, and of primary users of 
SUCCESS.  
! IoT networks should not replace or substitute for 
human care 
 
SUCCESS should not 
stigmatise the patients’ 
condition 
Privacy of process needs to be guaranteed: 
- data collected and transmitted and sensitive to 
condition 
- unobservabiity of data collection and 
communication 
… … … 
Safety, 
Security, and 
Reliability 
 
Security: 
! Robust security and integrity of data transmission and 
transfer when live, between home and hospital 
systems, between patient records and other 
datastores, and between devices and IoT components.   
! Visualisable security risks for users, to enhance 
awareness of security threats and attacks. 
! Provide appropriate risk evaluation and security 
measures to respond to such threats.  
 
 
 
Security of data has to be 
guaranteed at all times. 
- Data protection on servers according to security 
classification needs to be checked before 
connection and data transmission  
- Use security protocols between smartphone app 
and hospital for authentication, communication 
content, anonymity of sender  and other security 
and privacy goals. 
… … … 
Reliability: data loss or unavailability at optimal times will 
discourage adoption 
 
SUCCESS should aim at 
being operational 
permanently 
- Availability of system (various levels possible, 
specific to different system components)  
Transparency 
 
! The functionality of SUCCESS, and its potential 
weaknesses and effects, should be explained to its 
primary users in understandable terms. 
! Give notice to users of background data collection, 
monitoring and processing. 
 
Users should be aware of 
pros and cons of the system 
- Transparency to user, includes visualisation of 
possible attack by display of attack trees  
(potentially on smart phone) 
… … … … 
 Fig. 1. Relevant eFRIEND framework’s rules (left column) yield ethical requirement (middle column) that can be mapped to techncial system requirements
(right column).
communicated by a dedicated app on the smart phone that
sends the data to a server in the hospital.
A. Healthcare Scenario
In this simplified scenario, there are the patient and the
carer within a room together with the smart phone (see
Figure 2). The carer has access to the phone to support the
patient in handling the special diagnosis device, the smart
phone, and the app. The insider threat scenario has a second
banking app on the smart phone that needs the additional
authentication of a “secret key”: a small electronic device
providing authentication codes for one time use common for
private online banking. Assuming that the carer finds this
device in the room of the patient, he can steal this necessary
credential and use it to get onto the banking app. Thereby he
can get money from the patient’s account without consent.
B. Isabelle Insider framework Analysis
The Isabelle Insider framework enables formalization of the
infrastructure as a graph of locations, like room or smartphone,
in which human actors reside in locations and local policies
are attached to them as well. The details of this modeling and
analysis of the case study is given in [6]. As a brief illustration
we give some excerpts here. The local policies are given by
the following Isabelle definition and explained below.
local_policies G ≡
room
healthapp
bankapp
CarerPatient
Fig. 2. Health care scenario: carer and patient in the room may use
smartphone apps.
(λ x. if x = room then {(λ y. True,{get, put, move})}
else (if x = sphone then
{((λ y. has (y, ’’PIN’’)), {put,get,eval,move}),
(λ y. True, {})}
else (if x = healthapp then
{((λ y. (∃ n. (n @G sphone) ∧ Actor n = y)),
{get,put,eval,move})}
else (if x = bankapp then
{((λ y. (∃ n. (n @G sphone)
∧ Actor n = y ∧ has (y, ’’skey’’))),
{get,put,eval,move})}
else {}))))
In this policy, any actor can move to the room and when in
possession of the PIN can move onto the sphone and do all
actions there. The following restrictions are placed on the two
other locations.
healthapp: to move onto the healthapp and per-
form any action at this location, an actor must be at
the position sphone already;
bankapp: to move onto the bankapp and perform
any action at this location, an actor must be at the
position sphone already and in possession of the
skey.
C. Attack Tree Analysis
Attack Trees [12] are a graphical tree-based design language
for the stepwise investigation and quantification of attacks.
They have been integrated as an extension to the Isabelle
Insider framework [6]. This integration extends the Insider
model described in the previous section with a proof calculus
and modelchecking semantics for attack trees. The extension
allows stepwise refinement of attacks exhibiting possible at-
tack paths. The refinement of attack trees is illustrated in
Figure 3 with the refined attack path highlighted. The fol-
lowing refinement shows the logical expression of this attack
refinement. It expresses that the carer can evaluate the money
transfer on the bankapp by first stealing the skey, getting on
the phone, on the bankapp and then evaluating.
[Goto bankapp, Perform eval] ⊕move−grab∧
vhc_scenario
[Perform get, Goto sphone, Goto bankapp, Perform eval]
⊕move−grab∧
The proof calculus uses the refinement to prove that the
sequence of actions [Perform get, Goto sphone, Goto
bankapp, Perform eval] represents an attack in the given
infrastructure. The underlying semantics providing the notion
of validity of an attack is based on the state transition relation
defined in the modelchecking foundation (Kripke-structure
over infrastructure states) constructed in the Isabelle Insider
framework.
The attack tree analysis enables formalizing the require-
ments and high level architecture of the pilot case study. The
found attacks can be used to improve the security policies on
the model to provide a security enhanced formal specification
for the next phase of applying the BIP methodology to develop
a component architecture for the target IoT infrastructure in
which the security properties of the initial model are preserved
and certified code for the components (sensors and smart
phone) can be generated. We omit any details of this phase
since they will be reported elsewhere. In addition, the attack
trees and paths are naturally suited to visualize the security
risks to users showing up potential attacks.
V. SECURITY OF WEB-SERVICES FOR MOBILE DEVICES
We now move to the level of the overall system ar-
chitecture of SUCCESS in order to show up security and
privacy risks of IoT devices connected to data servers via
Internet and smart phone technology. In order to be compatible
with existing standard technologies, the target code for the
smartphone healthapp will be implemented in Java Script.
This app represents the client side interface to the database
servers in hospitals and other institutions, like research centers.
Fortunately, the BIP methodology [3] is flexible enough to
produce a Java Script app as certified target code for this
component. However, BIP is designed for the formal de-
velopment of synchronous systems. For the local scenario
of sensors connected to a central hub like the smartphone
either by physical link – like a blood sample sensor that
can be connected via the micro usb or lightning port of the
smartphone – or through close range networking protocols
– like motion sensors communicating with the phone via
Bluetooth [13], this is sufficient. Bluetooth is a packet-based
protocol with a master-slave structure where all slaves share
the master’s clock, i.e., it is synchronous and thus amenable
to the BIP code generation and certification process. But the
main data upload of the diagnosis data is to databases on
external servers connected via Internet. This is asynchronous
communication using web-services. The overall architecture is
shown in Figure 4 showing yet another Insider attack by the
carer (discussed further below).
Current standards of best practice for web services for
mobile applications have settled on two combinations of
technology (1) Java Script Object Notation (JSON) [14] over
RESTful web services using http(s) or (2) eXtensible Markup
Language XML over SOAP using Web Service Security
(WSS) [15]. Solution (1) is more lightweight since the JSON
data transfer standard is much less complex than XML. REST
prescribes a standard format for web services that is also less
complex than SOAP. So from that perspective, it is a clear
choice that in the context of mobile application the former is
preferable to guarantee less resource consumption caused by
an overhead of the SOAP/XML solution. The critical point is
the consideration of security. While the combination of JSON
over an https based RESTful web service is slick and appears
sufficient it relies on the “s” in https, i.e. Transport Layer
Security (TLS) (or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) how it was
originally called and is still more widely known as). TLS
is a good standard solution providing point-to-point security
between the http port or http proxy of the smart phone and
its counterpart on the database servers. However, it does not
provide end-to-end security. The difference is that in an end-
to-end security connection the security protection would be
between the healthapp and the database application on the
server instead of in between the http socket of the smartphone
usually on port 80 and the connected socket on the same
port on the server as it is provided by a TLS connection. Do
we need end-to-end security for SUCCESS? Consider again
Figure 3: since the carer needs to have access to the smart
phone to support the patient, he can still endanger privacy
by the following attack. Suppose, we only use point-to-point
security as given by TLS available on smart phones and servers
by default. The carer can use his access to the smartphone to
download a sniffer app from the app store, like Wireshark and
thereby he can trace and intercept all message communication
on the smartphone. This is again an insider attack since again
the carer is the attacker. The CMU Insider Threat Guide
Perform evalGoto bankapp
Goto sphone Goto bankapp
Perform get Goto sphone
Perform evalGoto bankapp
Goto sphone Goto bankapp
Fig. 3. Attack tree refinement enables stepwise attack path discovery.
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data
data
data
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Server
TLS
Fig. 4. Carer puts sniffer on smart phone eavesdropping on cleartext TCP packets.
provides the Insider Attack pattern of ambitious leader: if the
carer would collaborate with an ambitious leader outside the
home, he could install a specialized app on the phone that
would forward intercepted packages from the healthapp to
the server of the ambitious leader who could sell the data
to interested parties or use it directly for blackmail. Using the
Isabelle Insider framework with its extension to attack trees
[6] this attack can be discovered and proved in the attack tree
calculus.
[Goto sphone, Perform put,
Goto sniffer, Perform eval] ⊕put−sniffer∧
It exposes an interesting challenge for the Isabelle Insider
framework since an actor extends the infrastructure (and thus
implicitly the local policies) by adding the new location sniffer.
Technically, this Insider attack shows the necessity to have
an end-to-end encrypted connection between the smartphone
app process and the database application on the server. We
solved this in [7] by defining a dedicated end-to-end cryp-
tographic protocol between the app and the server database
application. Both stages, the attack analysis and the protocol
definition, are supported by Isabelle frameworks: (a) the
Isabelle Insider framework for human centric infrastructure
analysis and (b) the inductive approach for security protocol
verification. The combination of both within the Isabelle
framework is straightforward.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have given an overview of applying a range
of formal techniques to the security and privacy sensitive sce-
nario of healthcare focused on mobile Alzheimer’s diagnosis.
We only sketched the overall process but detailed on the use
of the eFRIENDS framework in combination with interactive
theorem proving in Isabelle in two stages: (1) for the elicitation
of ethically motivated requirements (2) for a formal machine-
supported analysis of attacks at early development stages.
Whilst we have applied eFRIEND to other projects, this is
the first time we are attempting to verify (or formally check
somehow) the application of the requirements derived from its
principles. A more technical consideration of the architecture
for the healthcare scenario revealed another Insider attack
possibility which could be remedied by a dedicated end-to-end
cryptographic protocol between a smart phone app and server
database applications. This protocol has been developed using
the inductive approach to security protocol verification in [7].
Related work on the formal treatment of component archi-
tectures is manyfold. For example, Hu et al [16] use stream
functions to specify component systems to define regular
behaviour and analyse for fault tolerance. However, they do not
address ethical issues nor security and do not use verification
tools. In the analysis of IoT architectures, mostly simpler
logical techniques are used for simulation and validation, for
example, Chmai et al. [17] use linear programming to evaluate
their efficiency.
It seems promising and a future challenge for SUCCESS
to explore this integration on privacy of IoT solutions for
vulnerable agents. Initial challenges like dynamic extension
of the infrastructure graph and local policies (example of the
sniffer app download) have already been identified in this
paper. The suggested use of the Bluetooth protocol [13] for the
short distance communication in the patients home offers an
additional security vulnerability due to symmetric key agree-
ment protocols. However, there is a stronger implementation
that uses asymmetric key establishment and that is feasible
for certain devices including smart phones [15]. Starting from
Bluetooth version 2.1 it is required to use Secure Simple
Pairing (SSP) for pairing which is the public key based pairing
method. If the attack analysis will show that a Bluetooth based
attack is a risk SUCCESS needs to address, then we have to
verify whether this asymmetric solution is feasible between the
motion sensors and smartphone. This part is addressed in the
central part of the formal development of a component based
architecture using the BIP methodology and is not covered in
this paper.
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